‘What they say peters down’: How non-profit leaders assess the trustworthiness of government - elite discourse and distrust in post-conflict Northern Ireland by Rice, Charis & Taylor, Maureen
  
‘What they say peters down’: How 
non-profit leaders assess the 
trustworthiness of government - elite 
discourse and distrust in post-conflict 
Northern Ireland 
Rice, C & Taylor, M 
Author post-print (accepted) deposited by Coventry University’s Repository 
 
Original citation & hyperlink:  
Rice, C & Taylor, M 2020, '‘What they say peters down’: How non-profit leaders 
assess the trustworthiness of government - elite discourse and distrust in post-










Copyright © and Moral Rights are retained by the author(s) and/ or other copyright 
owners. A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, 
without prior permission or charge. This item cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively 
from without first obtaining permission in writing from the copyright holder(s). The 
content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or medium 
without the formal permission of the copyright holders.  
 
This document is the author’s post-print version, incorporating any revisions agreed during 
the peer-review process. Some differences between the published version and this version 








‘What they say peters down’: How non-profit leaders assess the trustworthiness of 
government - elite discourse and distrust in post-conflict Northern Ireland 
 
Dr Charis Rice, Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations, Coventry University 
 Prof Maureen Taylor, University of Technology, Sydney 
 
Abstract  
This paper uses Northern Ireland as a research context to explore how elite discourse (from 
political and media actors/institutions) influences how Non-Profit Leaders (NPLs) assess the 
trustworthiness of government. We provide emergent themes which should aid theory 
development and practice in the area of political public relations by showing: 1) the value 
NPLs place on ‘soft’ trust qualities in trust assessments of government, namely benevolence; 
2) the importance NPLs place on communicative acts which model trust (e.g. dialogue, 
compromise, mediation) and; 3) the destructive role of divisive political elite discourse within 
a defective political system, amplified via the media, in NPLs’ distrust of government. The 
study thereby emphasises the crucial and constitutive role trust perceptions play in 
(in)effective political public relations, arguing that ‘trust’ must be defined by the perceiver 
and critically unpacked if public relations research is to fully appreciate its function. We 
propose that the nature of Northern Ireland’s post-conflict divided society, and political 
discourse in specific, makes certain trust antecedents most desirable to cross-community 
stakeholders. The findings contribute to further refining the concept of trust in public 
relations and they may also be instructive for other contexts.  
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Low levels of public trust in political institutions and actors worldwide are worrying for the 
health of democratic societies (Edelman Trust Barometer, 2019; Zmerli and van der Meer, 
2017). The nature of elite discourse is increasingly considered to play a role in citizen 
(dis)trust (Davis, 2019). For our purposes, elite discourse comprises, “the ways in which a 
topic is talked about and socially constructed” (Yeomans, 2016: 80) by political or media 
actors/institutions when they communicate information to the public. It is considered an 
instrumental element of a functioning, stable and critically trusting democracy (Davis, 2010; 
Habermas, 1989; Hetherington, 1998) that exudes a ‘sense of community’ (Kim and Cho, 
2019). Elite discourse is an important element of political public relations, understood as:  
the management process by which an organization or individual actor for political 
purposes, through purposeful communication and action, seeks to influence and 
establish, build, and maintain beneficial relationships and reputations with its key 
publics to help support its mission and achieve its goals (Strömbäck and Kiousis, 
2011:8).  
But, there is a gap in the literature as to the perspectives of one important public, Non-Profit 
Leaders (NPLs), on elite discourse and trust. Non-profit organisations – through their leaders 
– play an important role across societies because they advocate on behalf of other citizens. 
They have the potential to provide a nexus for communication, relationship and trust building 
within and between citizen and government groups (Fyall and McGuire, 2015; Toledano and 
Maplesden, 2016; Wollebæk and Strømsnes, 2008). Their roles may be even more poignant 
in a post-conflict, divided society (Puljek-Shank and Verkoren, 2017) like Northern Ireland, 
where trust in the government and the media is low (NISRA, 2017). In Northern Ireland, the 
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community and voluntary sector is vibrant, and this sector has been involved in mobilising 
civil society and engaging with state actors for peace, as well as building inter-community 
trust (Doran, 2010; Knox and Quirk, 2016; Stanton and Kelly, 2015). NPLs have specific 
professional knowledge and expertise, which affords them elite status (Davis, 2019). NPLs 
engage with both government and media to advocate for their stakeholders’ interests, and in 
this respect, they perform a public relations function, whether intentionally or not (Toledano 
and Maplesden, 2016). They usually have greater access to information than the public, 
because they are a regular consultee/interviewee on policy proposals and change (Jones and 
Gammell, 2009). NPL views on government trustworthiness matter since their trust 
perceptions are likely to impact on: how NPLs communicate about government with their 
stakeholders - it may impact on these stakeholders’ own views; how non-profit organisations 
interact with government to advocate for their stakeholders’ interests; and the strategic role 
cross-community non-profit organisations seek to play in political discourse and in civil 
society overall (Kearns, Bell, Deem and McShane, 2014; Liu and Stolle, 2017).   
 This paper therefore uses Northern Ireland as a context to explore what elements of 
elite discourse influence cross-community NPLs’ assessments of trust in the Northern Ireland 
government. While there has been some tentative academic research on public trust in 
Northern Ireland’s government (Clark and Wilford, 2012; Gormley-Heenan and Devine, 
2010), it is based on a secondary analysis of quantitative data and relates to a different 
political phase than this contemporary history study. Past research does not foreground trust 
theory, the role of political or media discourse, nor the perspectives of cross-community 
NPLs. Similarly, the public relations field still makes limited use of trust theory, even though 
trust is a sought after ‘intangible asset’ commonly referred to in its literature and practice 
(Olkkonen and Luoma-aho, 2019). We address this gap by using an in-depth, qualitative 
approach, which gives primacy to the words of interviewees in conceptualising trust and 
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distrust via elite discourse. Our objective is to identify emergent themes that should aid 
theoretical development in the area of political public relations and trust, especially given the 
paucity of dedicated research into the topic from the perspectives of cross-community NPLs 
in a divided society. The paper contributes to the public relations field by demonstrating the 
crucial and constitutive role trust perceptions play in (in) effective political public relations. 
We argue that ‘trust’ must be defined by the perceiver and critically unpacked if public 
relations research is to fully appreciate its function. We propose that the nature of Northern 
Ireland’s post-conflict divided society, and its political discourse in specific, makes certain 
trust antecedents most desirable to cross-community stakeholders, which may be instructive 
for other contexts.  
The next section (section 2) provides a conceptual background of trust and distrust. 
This is followed by an overview of the roles that public relations and elite discourse in 
specific may play in trust in government, peace and conflict. The fourth section presents our 
case study context, and the fifth section presents our research question and methodology. The 
sixth section presents the findings and discussion. The last section presents our conclusions 
and discusses the implications of the findings for theory and practice in the area of political 
public relations and trust. 
 
Trust and Distrust  
A recurring issue in studies of governmental trust is that ‘trust’ is often ill defined or 
not defined at all. A widely accepted definition within the trust literature is provided by 
Mayer, Davis and Schoorman:  
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the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party based on the 
expectation that the other will perform a particular action important to the trustor, 
irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that other party (1995:712).  
Regarding trust in ‘government’ (often also called ‘political trust’), following van der Meer 
and Zmerli (2017), we propose that this may encompass both “political institutions and 
actors” (2017:4). Further, in this paper, we follow Mayer et al. (1995) and Kong (2014) to 
understand trust as influenced by some or all of the following trustworthiness components: 
(1) perceived competence: the extent to which an individual perceives another individual or 
entity to be capable, effective, skilful, and professional; (2) perceived benevolence: the extent 
to which an individual perceives another individual or entity or actor to care about their 
welfare; and (3) perceived integrity: the extent to which an individual perceives another 
individual or entity to be sincere, to fulfil its promises and adhere to “a set of principles that 
the trustor finds acceptable” (Mayer et al., 1995: 719). 
Organisational studies reveal that trust is characterised by trustor feelings of 
positivity, confidence and security, which suspends risk through a ‘leap of faith’ (Fulmer and 
Gelfand, 2012; Mayer et al., 1995). Distrust, however, is characterised by “risk awareness, 
skepticism, watchfulness, vigilance, and sometimes perceptions of threat and fear” (Bijlsma-
Frankema, Sitkin and Weibel, 2015:6). Following developments in trust theory, we proceed 
on the basis that distrust is not the opposite of trust or ‘low trust’ but in fact is a distinct 
construct (Sitkin and Stickel, 1996). It involves value incongruence and pervasive negative 
expectations of the motives, intentions or actions of others, which after a tipping point 
precludes the existence of trust (Bijlsma-Frankema et al., 2015). Thus, a key thread in both 
trust and distrust research to date, is the importance of the compatibility between certain 
values and expectations in explicating the character of a given relationship, be it individual or 
institutional in nature.  
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Public Relations, Elite Discourse, Peace and Conflict 
Organisational studies show that communication is a crucial vehicle of trust 
development (Thomas, Zolin and Hartman, 2009) and from a normative perspective, public 
relations communication, in particular, is supposed to build trust (Kent and Taylor, 2002; 
Olkkonen and Luoma-aho, 2019; Sommerfeldt, 2013). For example, trusting leadership 
behaviours can ‘trickle down’ via strategic leadership communication from the top to lower 
levels, or indeed ‘trickle up’ from one direct relationship to another more distant relationship 
(Fulmer and Ostroff, 2017). Whiteley, Clarke, Sanders and Stewart (2016) suggest that this 
process is applicable to public trust in local politicians and government institutions but there 
is little clarity about how or why this occurs.  
As Wong notes: “Trust development is an evolutionary process that involves constant 
evaluation and learning about the behaviours of the trustees” (2016:2). Through public 
communication and public relations activities, citizens are able to make such judgements 
about political actors, and this in turn affects how they engage with the democratic process 
(Brunner and Smallwood, 2019; Hargie and Irving, 2017). This is the case in any democratic 
society but nations that emerge from conflict often need to rebuild relationships between 
citizens and their government and between groups of citizens themselves (Doerfel and 
Taylor, 2004). Citizens living in deeply divided or conflict affected societies may naturally 
have different expectations to the norm of government trustworthiness (e.g. transparency, 
competence), such as to rebuild societal divides and work for the ‘common good’ (Taylor, 
2000; Wong, 2016), or indeed to represent group interests (Avraham, 2003). 
 New post-conflict relationships require strategic communication management. This 
involves many levels of communication such as political and governmental public relations 
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(Rice and Somerville, 2013), government interventions and local communities mobilizing 
interest, aggregating into national, large-scale collective action (Minkoff, 1997). But the 
discourse of communicative elites, that is, political and media actors, undoubtedly have 
substantial power to influence this rebuilding. Political and media elites can influence the 
public ‘agenda’ by which citizens are directed to think about certain issues (McCombs and 
Shaw, 1972). Underlying this influence are public relations strategies and communication 
management techniques that help distribute power and societal relations (Bourne, 2013). 
Conflict focused, simplistic language may fuel conflict ‘frames’ (Entman, 1993), tools that 
elites can employ (Vliegenthart and van Zoonen, 2011) to highlight difference and division 
over similarity and reconciliation. Framing is a powerful element of the ‘collective struggle 
over meaning’ involving wider professional, organisational and socialisation processes 
(Vliegenthart and van Zoonen, 2011: 112). Conflict frames can reduce the perceived capacity 
for deliberation and political outcomes based on compromise (Amsalem, Sheafer, Walgrave, 
Loewen and Soroka, 2017), and incite inter-group tensions and distrust of ‘the other’ 
(Armoudian, 2015; Avraham, 2003). The inter-relationship of political and media discourse 
within a divided society can facilitate or impede peacebuilding through for example, 
promoting elite consensus and positive messages of reconciliation, or not (Wolfsfeld, 2004).  
 Van Wessel (2014) reminds us that evaluations of government are ‘communicatively 
constituted’ through discursive engagements with friends, family, government institutions, 
public services, the media and so on. But in contemporary (Western) democracies, it is 
through mediated communication of political actors and institutions that citizens largely learn 
about the issues of the day. Indeed Seyd states that research has explained political distrust 
as: “the consequence of high public demands or expectations – fuelled by politicians 
themselves as well as by the media – that are not met by the outputs of the political process” 
(2015:74). This is likely to be the case even with NPLs, who may have more direct 
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engagement with government (Jones and Gammell, 2009). Indeed, political and media elites 
themselves use the media to strategically communicate with, and influence, each other 
(Davis, 2007, 2010). While van Wessel acknowledges that citizens are: “active parties in the 
constitution of representation” (2014:761), the author found that people do derive most of 
their communication about government from political and media discourse. Therefore, we 
prioritise the crucial – yet not definitive – role of political and media discourse in individuals’ 
perceptions of government. We argue that if citizens ‘decontextualize’ the discourse of 
government and media (van Wessel, 2014), then those citizens with the most ‘reach’ (through 
their professional networks, resources and knowledge) to do so should be investigated.  
 
Case Study Context: Northern Ireland 
Northern Ireland is often promoted as a successful example of peacebuilding (Stanton 
and Kelly, 2015). However, an array of tensions underpins Northern Ireland society, and 
sporadic terrorist activity and sectarian violence lead many to conclude that Northern Ireland is 
“neither at war nor at peace” (Hargie and Irving, 2017: 50). These tensions manifest in its 
complex government institutions, clearly evident by the fact that at the time of writing, the 
institutions have not been functioning for almost three years (since January 2017)i. This paper 
is based on empirical data, collected during a time when Northern Ireland’s power-sharing 
government had been functioning without suspension for almost a decade, albeit with varying 
degrees of stability.  
Consociational ‘mandatory power-sharing’ government was adopted in order to 
stabilise society after thirty years of violent ethnopolitical conflict between 
Unionists/Protestants and Nationalists/Catholics, and as a result of the 1998 Good Friday 
Agreement peace treatyii. This governance typically includes grand coalitions between the main 
groups/communities in a region; a cross-community ‘weighted majority’ system of 
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parliamentary voting meaning a simple majority is not enough in decision making processes; 
and proportionality to ensure fair representation for all sides in key societal institutions, such as 
political office, the civil service, and policing (Rice and Somerville, 2017). All Assembly 
(legislative body) members must designate themselves ‘nationalist’, ‘unionist’, or ‘other’.  
The media’s role is also important in understanding the political and post-conflict 
context. The main broadcast outlets, BBC Northern Ireland, Ulster Television (UTV), and 
several independent radio channels strive for impartiality in their news coverage of Northern 
Ireland and promote themselves as serving the whole population (Lafferty, 2014). Of the three 
national daily newspapers, only The Belfast Telegraph targets both communities in Northern 
Ireland (Rice and Somerville, 2017). The Irish News appeals to the Nationalist community and 
the News Letter appeals to the Unionist community. Local politicians and their policies are now 
under daily media scrutiny and journalists must report on policy matters rather than just 
political and societal violence (McLaughlin and Baker, 2012).  
Non-profit organizations (NPOs) also have a role to play in the post-conflict public 
sphere. There are currently over 6000 NPOs, covering a wide range of services including 
community development, community relations, children’s services, education and training, 
health and wellbeing, advocacy and policy (NICVA, 2016). Past studies of the sector have 
noted that during periods of Direct Rule (where Northern Ireland was governed remotely from 
Westminster, England, 1972-1998, with subsequent intermittent periods during inter-party 
breakdown), political stalemate and conflict meant community groups grew in number and in 
influence. To some extent this meant that the: “voluntary sector came to occupy much of the 
public space in which the formal political structure otherwise would have existed” (Cochrane 
and Dunn, 2002:151).  
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Some community groups in Northern Ireland are considered to have played a role in 
bringing about peace, channeling the voice of the majority of citizens who wanted a peaceful 
resolution to the conflict through dialogue, not violence (Acheson, Williamson, Cairns and 
Stringer, 2006; Knox and Quirk, 2016). A growing number of individuals in Northern Ireland 
now identify as the more inclusive category of ‘Northern Irish’, rather than ‘British’ or ‘Irish’, 
which lays the foundation for further cross-community integration (Hargie and Irving, 2017). 
Similarly, most citizens value good cross-community relations (ARK, 2018). At the same time, 
high levels of public distrust in both government and the media have been reported (NISRA, 
2017). Since cross-community organizations can be considered to reflect the ethos of a 
significant proportion of Northern Ireland society, and that, “Most community relations activity 
operates within and through the community and voluntary sector networks” (Doran, 2010:138), 
we believe their leaders are an important route into how elite discourse informs perceptions of 
trust in government in the recent political climate.  
 
Research Question and Methodology 
We pose the following over-arching research question: What elements of elite (government 
and media) discourse influence NPLs’ assessments of the trustworthiness of government in 
Northern Ireland? 
Approach 
In-depth semi-structured interviews were selected to answer the research question and to 
explore explanations from persons with experience or expertise (Lindlof and Taylor, 
2011:174-175). In-depth interviews coupled with rigorous thematic analysis proved insightful 
for exploring the, “genesis of general disposition to trust or distrust, through reconstructing 
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individual histories of life experiences and interactions with government” (Van de Walle and 
Six, 2014:171).  
Sample  
Leaders/key representatives from 17 established non-profit cross-community 
organisations currently operating in Northern Ireland, mainly within the Belfast and County 
Antrim areas, comprise the purposive and convenience-based sample. Through a combination 
of background research and the lead researcher’s local knowledge, the research team selected 
organisations that were established and well known in the local areaiii, which together 
represented a breadth of civil society activities and experiences. Organisations in our sample 
cross a wide spectrum, namely peace and reconciliation work and community relations, but 
also advocacy, education, lobbying, faith-based relations. Of the 17 leaders interviewed, all 
worked at organisations explicitly promoted as ‘cross-community’ or were involved in cross-
community work. As we have acknowledged thus far, our interviewees’ perspectives cannot 
of course be considered representative of NPLs generally, the non-profit sector in Northern 
Ireland as a whole or the cross-community sector in specific, nor ‘the public’. Nonetheless, 
their role as cross-community network facilitators and their engagement with a wide range of 
people (both politically engaged and not so) means that their experiences provide an 
important insight (Sommerfeldt, 2013) about trust and elite discourse when compared and 
contrasted across the whole sample.  
While not ‘traditional’ elites (e.g. those in positions of direct political power), our 
cohort comprises a sample of ‘elite intermediaries’ who have an organized, specialist 
influence in civil society, often exercised through public relations activities (Davis, 2019). 
Interviewing elites presents particular challenges, such as accessing busy professionals, a 
need to be educated in the interviewees’ general discourse and sectoral terms (Littig, 2009), 
how to best navigate power dynamics and how the researcher’s ‘positionality’ will be 
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perceived by the interviewee (Petkov and Kaoullas, 2016). There are also context-specific 
issues to consider in a divided society, such that, “seemingly straightforward questions can 
provoke adversarial, sectarian responses" (McEvoy, 2006:196). These issues meant that time 
and care was devoted to background research, tactfully contacting and following up 
interviewees, interview preparation and interview schedule design. Similarly, we recognized 
that Northern Ireland is a small public sphere, and that opinion on virtually any aspect of 
community relations and governance is easily politicised. Additionally, the majority of these 
organisations rely on some form of government funding so the research team gave all 
interviewees personal and organisational anonymity; anonymity allowed interviewees to 
speak freely on a range of relevant topics. 
 
Procedures 
All individuals were firstly contacted via email, where they received an informed 
consent form for signature prior to the interview and a Participant Information Sheet, which 
gave an overview of the research project for their perusal. Interviews were conducted in the 
interviewees’ workplaces, lasting around one hour. All interviews were audio recorded and 
later transcribed in full. The interviews were carried out between May 2016 and February 
2017; during this time, the (British Unionist) Democratic Unionist Party, DUP, (Irish 
Republican) Sinn Fein and an independent unionist Justice Minister comprised the Executive.  
It was a politically turbulent (though not historically unusual) time of elections, deadlock and 
scandaliv, and since data collection concluded, the Northern Ireland Executive and Assembly 
have not been operational (since January 2017)v. Following a pre-prepared, loose interview 
schedule, the interviewer asked each individual about their professional role, organisation and 
daily duties, before asking exploratory questions about their conception of trust. Interviewees 
were asked about how they sourced information on Northern Ireland government and how 
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they conceptualised ‘government’, before being asked about their trust in government and 
their reasons for this assessment. Thus, rather than becoming embroiled in a debate about 
whether trust in government is culturally or institutionally based (e.g. see Mishler and Rose, 
2001; Wong, 2016), we allowed our research participants to make connections, in line with 
our exploratory approach.   
Data Analysis 
Data analysis employed both inductive and deductive techniques. Following an 
extensive literature review and an initial scoping of the data, we developed an a priori 
codebook to capture ideas about trust and distrust. We included the adapted codes for 
trustworthiness outlined in our definition featuring competence, benevolence, and integrity 
(Mayer et al., 1995; Kong, 2014), as well as ‘distrustworthiness’ (e.g. incompetent, self-
interested, exploitative, deceitful). We also included the distinct indicators of distrust we 
found in past literature, namely from Bijlisma-Frankema et al. (2015). We employed a broad 
interviewee-directed definition of ‘government’ in line with our exploratory approach. 
Notably, in the end, we found that interviewees’ conceptions of ‘government’ were based 
around the Northern Ireland Assembly, the Northern Ireland Executive and the main political 
parties; thus other seemingly important institutions for trust such as the police and the courts 
(Uslaner, 2008) were not discussed to any great extent by our interviewees. Moreover, we 
were open to coding other ideas that linked to trust and/or elite discourse. For example, 
discussion of collaboration, dialogue and compromise was often strongly associated with, or 
even defined by interviewees as trust behaviours, whereas competition, dispute and deadlock 
were considered examples of distrust; we wanted to allow interviewees to ‘speak for 
themselves’ and therefore we recorded these instances.   
To assign data extracts to our categories, the coding of the interview data was 
conducted in the first instance, at the manifest (explicit) level and the results organised 
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thematically, with findings based on the recurrent patterns and categories which surfaced in 
the discourse (Deacon, Pickering, Golding, and Murdock, 2007). Thus we progressed from 
deductive and inductive ‘first-order codes’ to inductive ‘second-order themes’ (Brown and 
Coupland, 2015). Themes were then more deeply analysed by attending to the way 
interviewees expressed their opinions and emotions on the topics and recounted their 
experiences; we reflected on their choice of terminology, their focus, examples and narratives 
and how that helped us answer the research question ‘in context’ (Larkin, Watts and Clifton, 
2006). Coding was independently verified or negotiated between the two researchers in terms 
of how statements were interpreted and assigned to categories and we had further 
confirmation through the assistance of a third experienced coder. While we have a large 
amount of rich data from the interviews, space restrictions require us to be selective in 
presenting our findings. In our findings section, we report and analyse the themes which 
recurred most frequently across participants and which give us the most insight into our 
research question.  In reporting quotes from our interviewees, we denote individuals as C1, 
through C17. 
 
Findings and Discussion 
Assessing Trustworthiness 
Overall, NPLs defined ‘trust’ in line with previous trust research i.e. 
benevolence/concern for interests; integrity; competence/ability. For example, one stated: 
‘you trust your friends and your family because you think they have your best interests at 
heart.  You trust, say, pilots or surgeons or other experts because they are competent’ (C4).  
However, distrust was the main sentiment expressed in our interviews towards government, 
for example:  
15 
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‘[distrust] it's seeing something with a particular filter on where it doesn't really 
matter what they are going to say…you are going to view everything through that 
filter…it's not the civil servants I am thinking about there, it is the different [political] 
parties’ (C7).  
A number of themes emerged through our analysis of participants’ assessments of 
government (dis)trustworthiness, which strongly prioritise the role of political leaders and 
media coverage in distrust of government. We discuss these below. 
 
Political Leaders Model Distrust: The Double Integrity Problem 
A theme which distinguished how ‘distrustworthiness’ attributions were made was the 
sentiment that political leaders do not model trust behaviours through their public 
communication. This largely concerned the fact that government ministers often talked 
negatively about each other in the media, play a strategic ‘blame game’ (Nord and Olsson, 
2013) and that this decreased interviewees’ confidence in their ability to work productively 
for Northern Ireland citizens. One leader stated: ‘I wouldn't trust people who don't trust each 
other…they don't model the coming together within society… Ministers are saying terrible 
things about each other and threatening to walk out’ (C3). This antagonistic behaviour fuelled 
distrust in government and was considered to have societal ramifications because, ‘there has 
been no leaders emerged to unite us’ (C9). Another agreed that, ‘What they are saying peters 
down’ (C16). In their seminal work, Mayer at al. (1995) explain that: “The relationship 
between integrity and trust involves the trustor's perception that the trustee adheres to a set of 
principles that the trustor finds acceptable” (p.719). In the case of NPLs’ views of elite 
discourse, it is mediated displays of inter-group conflict between political elites which 
demonstrate how their principles and values conflict with each other, together with the 
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contrast between NPLs’ own professional values and the partisan values of political elites, 
that are important in explaining their distrust perceptions towards government; we find here 
therefore a kind of ‘double integrity problem’.  
Political leaders’ communicative behaviours appear in sharp contrast to the cross-
community work that NPLs facilitate which is inclusive of all sides of the community. NPLs 
see themselves as actively involved in building community trust through practical support 
(e.g. in housing, education) and through the symbolic, communicative functions of 
community relationship building via engagement, dialogue, tolerance and mutual 
understanding, as illustrated in the following quote of the mission of one NPL’s organisation:  
‘dialogue and understanding… community relations are actually all part of being a 
witness to whatever you believe in… we are interested in people coming from across 
fracture lines… and recognising [our organisation as] a safe and inclusive place’ 
(C12).  
 Such an approach demonstrates the elements of risk and vulnerability, in engaging 
with others dissimilar or unknown to us, required for trust building (Fulmer and Gelfand, 
2012).  
 Indeed, several leaders commented that communities had progressed much further than 
political actors in terms of building peaceful, caring and trusting relationships with each other. 
Common sentiments were, for example: ‘communities have moved well beyond our 
politicians’ (C6); and: ‘…we are miles ahead of the politicians…progress is happening despite 
the politicians, rather than because of them’ (C3). One interviewee went further to explain that 
their organisation had actually helped to build up trust in government by linking their members 
with government services and political initiatives, they stated:  
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“The people that we would engage with would have a more positive outlook [on 
government] because we are involving them in the political system…So they would 
have a slightly better outlook on the system, on politics, would trust politics…we 
have been building trust up” (C5).  
 
Benevolence and Political Culture 
A related issue that was important in NPLs’ trust assessments was the role of negative 
and divisive inter-party communication, typified as ‘permanent campaigning’ (Blumenthal, 
1982) in diminishing perceptions of benevolence. This leads to distrust in both government 
ministers specifically, and politicians generally, to make decisions in the interests of the 
whole of Northern Ireland society (i.e. benevolence), rather than on the basis of partisan 
(sectarian) concerns: ‘[politicians] bring a party political slant to nearly every 
decision…regardless of what's best for people in Northern Ireland’ (C7). Similarly, NPLs 
commented that: a trustworthy government would need to demonstrate ‘openness and 
transparency, evidence-led decision making, which I don't think we have’ (C15). Instead, 
common statements were: 
‘in that recent election for example, there was so much focus put on fear… if you 
don't vote for ‘us’ then ‘they'll’ get in…government here I think has a lot of work to 
do to make people feel that they can trust them to look after their interests rather than 
just sectarian interests’ (C7).  
Another NPL stated: ‘instead of offering people any sort of vision, they are offering to 
protect people from what they see as a nightmare…It's identifying each other against the 
other side’ (C4). This form of deliberate divisive political communication is typical of 
Northern Ireland’s political culture (Hayward, 2011; Pow and Matthews, 2017) because there 
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is little incentive for elites to attract voters from other communities when support is based on 
ethnonational group identification and intra-community competition (Horowitz, 2014). While 
the context – the consociational political system - is a crucial contributing factor for distrust 
perceptions, it is considered surmountable by NPLs, given political leader will, and thus it is 
this lack of desire from political leaders that fuels distrust.  
Clearly, when Northern Ireland’s government institutions are functioning, the 
communicative relationships between the political parties in Northern Ireland’s mandatory 
coalition strongly affects trust in government as a whole (Bean, 2001). The partisan nature of 
elite discourse in policy debate and ‘policy conflict’ appears to reduce the perception of 
government responsiveness and ‘commitment to the public good’ (van Wessel, 2014:772). 
Indeed, a perceived lack of benevolence appeared to over-ride any other trust inducing 
qualities from government such as competence, as one interviewee demonstrates below:  
‘I drive to work every morning and the traffic lights are working…the roads are good 
quality…we have a functioning administrative society. [But] I do not trust our 
government…to have the needs of everyone at heart.  Our politics are very 
ideological’ (C8). 
This suggests, as argued elsewhere (e.g. Cho, 2006; Van de Walle and Six, 2014), that 
trust qualities such as competence might reduce the pervasive nature of distrust, but unlike 
benevolence, might not actually foster trust. Benevolence, from the perspective of our 
interviewees, is characterised by inter-communal dialogue and genuine concern and respect 
for difference; indeed dialogue is considered one of the hallmarks of rebuilding trust between 
groups (Kent and Taylor, 2002). NPLs often talked in benevolent terms about their own 
practice: ‘I make a difference doing what I am doing… And if it is talking to people, maybe 
in ordinary society you wouldn't be talking to, then yes that's good too’ (C16). Indeed, 
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benevolence was even characterised by altruism by this same interviewee: ‘I want to see a 
peaceful society, I suppose what I am actually aiming for is to lose my job’ (C16), a 
sentiment reflected in Toledano’s (2016) study of a PR practitioner working for reconciliation 
in another divided society. 
 
Media Framing: Limited Competence, Propagating Division and Distrust 
Media were clearly considered to fuel the antagonistic political climate. Most of the 
examples provided by leaders on their trust assessments were mass-mediated, as found 
elsewhere in study of citizen perception (van Wessel, 2014). NPLs discussed the role of 
traditional media (and to a lesser extent, social media) in ‘framing’ political issues, that is, 
how a version of reality is made salient and transferred to an audience through the use of 
specific discourse and focus (Entman, 1993). Specifically, leaders commented on how the 
media plays a role in propagating division, namely through recycling ‘old’ sectarian debates, 
instigated by politicians. One NPL stated:  
‘there are a lot of us that just want to move on…the media help the parties to drag us 
back…when they [political parties] are going down sectarian lines, the media could 
just say, we are not going to give that any air time…but they do…they keep the 
negative ‘politiking’ going’ (C7).  
Thus, there was a general consensus that the media had a moral responsibility to at 
least not incite sectarian division, or even to try to alleviate it, a sentiment found in other 
post-conflict contexts (Hanitzsch, 2007; Wolfsfeld, 2004). But several leaders discussed the 
media as lacking the required competence to stimulate public debate, for example one said: 
‘everything is very shallow here…the way people communicate and analyze problems is just 
very inward looking, the debate is never broadened…I think that is the same with politics’ 
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(C6). Media, like politicians, are not trusted to deliver the competent information that the 
public needs for informed public deliberations that may strengthen the democratic process 
(Ettema, 2007). Yet, media seem influential in terms of contributing to the negative tone of 
political discourse, which influences NPLs’ distrust. This may reflect the importance of 
‘credible communications’ for perceptions of trustworthiness (Mayer et al., 1995).  
 
Inadequate Consultation: Conflicting Expectations 
Further, NPLs expressed distrust towards government because of an inadequate 
consultation process. Consultation was considered to be disingenuous, an exercise in 
strategically managed public relations, rather than their normative expectation of a 
participatory process with open ended outcomes (Motion, 2005). One interviewee explained: 
‘It’s tick box PR rather than consultation. People sell their idea rather than consult on it. 
Single option consultations where they give you no choice, where they do it too late, 
predetermined consultations’ (C13).  
 Several NPLs emphasised what they considered to be the strategic timing of 
government consultations in order that community groups could not respond adequately, 
which they felt exploited their position as resource-limited organisations and left them 
‘disempowered’ (C2). Another stated: 
“They don't have a dialogue, they don't deliberate... They don't consider all the 
arguments, [or] look at the different priorities and values of others who haven't been 
invited to the consultation…given that they could be stakeholders…it's just not proper 
engagement” (C4). 
 These perspectives support Wong’s (2016) argument that citizen trust in government 
is built through positive experiences of engagement, which involves communication for 
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establishing mutual expectations and preferences, and shows government concern for public 
interests (p. 4). Our data also confirms the notion that significant power imbalances in a 
relationship can inhibit trust (Oberg and Svensson, 2010), exemplified by consultation in this 
case, for example this NPL stated:  
“our difficulty in working with them [government] to date is that the power all lies 
with them. For example, early on we agreed that we wouldn't write about stuff until 
the minister signed off, which seemed fair enough…we thought well, the minister will 
probably look at these and sign them off in a number of weeks…now we are waiting 6 
months.  And so we feel almost, betrayed…From now on everything is in the open. 
All correspondence with government is published on our website, because we can't 
afford to be caught in that trap” (C4). 
While NPLs may have more direct engagement and communication with government, 
rather than solely through mediated communication, this falls short of their normative 
expectations and therefore does not contribute to trust building. Direct engagement seemed 
beneficial in building productive relationships (rather than ‘trust’ per se) only with individual 
(local) politicians with whom an interviewee had repeated interactions, emphasising the 
importance of distinguishing between different referents and processes of trust (Fulmer and 
Gelfand, 2012). For example one NPL explained: “if I was looking to get a steer on 
something or looking to get influence, I would identify particular people in particular parties 
to say can I talk to you about this” (C10); another stated: “we've a very very good 
relationship with the local councillors…we had fantastic support…like when we had an issue 
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Our findings provide insights for political public relations scholars who study 
government trust in divided societies and elsewhere, and for practitioners concerned with the 
topic. The findings are informed by cross-community non-profit leaders’ perspectives at a 
time when the government institutions were unstable, but functioning. Given what has since 
transpired (interparty breakdown leading to the institutions not operating for almost three 
years at the time of writing), the findings must be viewed through this contemporary history 
lens. Yet, the current state of affairs, in our opinion, makes the findings even more pertinent.  
 
‘Soft’ Trust: Benevolence Matters 
 Clearly, perceptions of value incongruence and negative expectations of behaviour 
are critical to explaining NPL distrust in our case study, as elsewhere (Bijlsma-Frankema et 
al., 2015). However, we found that benevolence (genuine care and concern for others) is a 
central focus of trust or distrust perceptions in this context. Similar results have been found in 
other post-conflict countries (Wong, 2016), or non-Western contexts (Kong, 2014). Given the 
affective nature of benevolence, this supports the emotional nature of trust (Theiss-Morse and 
Barton, 2017), and of political public relations (Nord and Olsson, 2013) which tends to, so 
far, be overlooked in the study of government trust and political public relations research. A 
perceived genuine concern for the public good, rather than for one’s voters, has similarly 
been found to be important in assessments of government responsiveness and representation 
elsewhere, for example in the Netherlands (van Wessel, 2014), suggesting that exploring 
benevolence in elite discourse is a legitimate line of inquiry for other stable contexts. Thus, 
our findings strengthen the notion that different qualities of trust, for example, benevolence 
over competence, may be more important depending on the context and audience (Cho, 
2006).   
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More attention should therefore be paid, by both public relations scholars and those 
communicating on behalf of governments, to how communicating and enacting the ‘soft’ 
qualities of trust might improve trust in government among NPLs and citizens generally. In 
this way, our findings support calls within the public relations literature for better 
appreciation of ‘Public Interest Relations’ (Brunner and Smallwood, 2019), a public relations 
approach which prioritises the public interest through creating spaces for community 
dialogue and respectful debate to build ‘goodwill’ trust. At the same time, our findings show 
that we must consider the impact of the institutional system and political culture (Rice and 
Somerville, 2017) when investigating trust in government - in providing the conditions for 
political leaders to communicate benevolently, which appear to be restrictive (and presently 
non-existent) in the Northern Ireland context. Taken together, our evidence supports the 
notion that by analysing “the language of trust”, one can explore, “the core values of an 
individual, a group or a society at a given time and place” (Wubs-Mrozewicz, 2019: 1).  
 
(Dis)trust Transference: Prioritising Public Relations 
Second, our study has implications for how trust or distrust is transferred through elite 
discourse.  The cross-community NPLs talked extensively about working and communicating 
both with government and other community groups and actors to build trust ‘across the 
divide’ despite the antagonistic rhetoric they receive from political and media elites, even 
despite their own distrust in government. In this way, NPLs engage in a form of activist 
public relations that prioritises dialogue and aligns with their personal, professional and 
organizational values of reconciliation (Toledano, 2016). This provides encouraging evidence 
that trust can be built even within a climate of distrust and that strategic communication is a 
crucial vehicle of doing so. NPLs believe societal trust is being built from the bottom up, 
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through the benevolent communication and actions of their community groups. Conceivably, 
better appreciation from political elites of, and support for, the role of cross-community 
communication networks in building societal trust could improve not only ‘generalized trust’ 
(Uslaner, 2002) and encourage a peaceful society, but may also improve citizen trust in 
government (Wong, 2016); but this ‘trickle up’ notion (Fulmer and Ostroff, 2017) requires 
dedicated and more wide-ranging research. 
 
Limitations and Further Research 
The role of elite discourse in fostering or hindering trust in government is complex 
and will require different public relations approaches. We acknowledge that we have 
interviewed strongly engaged leaders within one (relatively unique) political context who 
hold positions of varying degrees of community influence at only one point in time.  Our 
findings therefore reflect these limitations. These individuals have a cross-community ethos, 
which surely influences how they perceive elite discourse. It is recognised that our non-
partisan sample might be particularly averse to political confrontation and to value 
benevolence-based compromise, this might be different for partisans who identify strongly 
with particular political parties (e.g. see McLaughlin, McLeod, Davis, Perryman and Mun, 
2017). Indeed, NPL expectations of government may be higher or lower than what we would 
find among the ‘average citizen’ or among other types of leaders (Bish and Becker, 2016). 
Additionally, since our study was designed to be exploratory in nature, we cannot infer 
causation in any definitive terms through our relatively modest qualitative sample and 
method. Further research might explore the longevity of our findings alongside under what 
particular conditions (e.g. media form, political issue type, audience demographic) trust is 
most affected by elite discourse in this context, as well as the generalisability of our findings.  
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Nonetheless, our empirical evidence strongly suggests that the divisive discourse of 
political leaders plays a crucial agenda-setting role in NPLs’ perceptions of distrust in the 
Northern Ireland government, when the institutions are functioning. When divisive words and 
deeds are amplified by media, then conflict, rather than peace, becomes the dominant frame 
through which NPLs view their government. These conclusions, albeit somewhat 
disheartening, point to ways forward. Politicians need to understand how their 
communicative behaviours, which lack benevolence, are hindering government trust among 
even engaged citizens. Lastly, community organisations can and, arguably do, make a 
positive contribution to building trust in a post-conflict society, which can be further explored 
and capitalized upon for peace development. In an era of distrust of government and media 
elites and increasingly divisive politics across the globe (Davis, 2019), building trustful 
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